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A BID FOR A NEW FUTURE: WHAT ARE THE 
EFFECTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEW 
NATIONAL PUBLIC BIDDING REGULATIONS ON 
LAND USE RIGHTS ASSIGNMENT IN CHINA? 
INTRODUCTION 
Since opening up to market reforms in 1978, China has experienced 
tremendous economic growth. A significant part of the growth is 
attributable to various land use rights reforms that have allowed the 
previous land allocation system to move to a market-oriented approach.1  
On July 1, 2002, a new set of Regulations regarding the acquisition of 
land use rights was promulgated.2 The Regulations mandate national 
standardized procedures for the bidding, auction, and listing of land use 
rights.3 The main purpose of the Regulations is to add transparency and 
fairness to the land use rights markets by establishing an “open, fair, and 
impartial land use system.”4 The Regulations also mandate that all land 
use rights for business operations must be assigned by public bidding, 
auction, or listing.5  
The new Regulations offer significant advantages over the previous 
approach to land use rights acquisition, but should be viewed with 
caution.6 They mandate public bids, auctions, or lists in the assignment of 
land use rights and create a standardized set of acquisition procedures, 
adding transparency to the land use rights acquisition system.7 Though 
 1. THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORMS UPON LAND, PROPERTY, AND CONSTRUCTION 
26 (Jean Jinghan Chen & David Wills eds., 1999). 
As a part of the Chinese economic reform, land reform is necessary to change the previous 
allocation system to a market driven system . . . . As a result, successive reforms of China’s 
land tenure system have been implemented, culminating in the establishment of a system of 
“land use rights” (LURs) which represents the equivalent of a leasehold system. 
Id. 
 2. Zhao Biao Pai Mai Gua Pai Chu Rang Guo You Tu Di Shi Yong Gui Ding [Regulations 
Assignment of State-owned Land Use Rights through Inviting Bids, Auctions, and Listing], P.R.C. 
Ministry of Land Resources, July 1, 2002, art. 28 (2002) (P.R.C.), in Guowuy van Gongbao [State 
Council Gazette], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-5/16/content_395800.htm (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Regulations]. 
 3. Id. art. 3. 
 4. Id. art. 1. See also China to Announce Revised Land-Use Policies, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, 
Sept. 16, 2002, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-09/15/content_562814.htm (last visited Oct. 
22, 2004). 
 5. Regulations, supra note 2, art. 4. 
 6. David Murphy, Big Deal: The Best Bid Wins, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 27, 2002, at 28. 
 7. Id. 
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promulgated at the national level, implementation must be performed at 
the local level, which may prove difficult.8 
The Regulations may pose serious dangers to local developers. Past 
Chinese urban and rural experiences with the Regulations’ market-oriented 
approach may offer insight into its potential effects. Following a market-
oriented approach to determine the price of land use rights promotes the 
impartial treatment of domestic and foreign enterprises in the acquisition 
of land use rights.9 However, as prices for land use rights increase due to 
open competition, local investors lacking the deep pockets enjoyed by 
their foreign counterparts may be left out.10  
Part I offers a general background on land use rights in China, and sets 
forth the differences among the types of land use rights and the various 
land use rights acquisition processes. Part II sets out the key aspects of the 
Regulations. Part III discusses the various effects of the Regulations. Part 
IV expands on the effects of the Regulations, based on past experiences 
with the market approach, in both the urban and rural landscape. 
I. BACKGROUND ON LAND USE RIGHTS 
A. Land Use Rights Systems 
After the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, a socialist 
political and economic system was installed. This system provided for 
highly centralized management and public ownership of land.11 For the 
next thirty years, land was progressively confiscated by the State and 
allocated administratively by various planning departments without 
payment.12 Landholders of land under this system do not actually own the 
land;13 rather, they hold an allocated land use right, or the right to use the 
 8. Id. at 28–29. “Lower down the administrative ladder, cities are passing various versions and 
interpretations of the national regulation.” Id. at 29. 
 9. See China to Announce Revised Land-Use Policies, supra note 4. 
 10. Id. “[T]he regulations will force Chinese enterprises to compete with powerful foreign 
counterparts in a more transparent and fair land market without the government protection they 
previously enjoyed.” Id. 
 11. PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 14 (2000). “As a 
part of this highly centralized and controlled economic system, China established its real property 
administration and management system.” Id.  
 12. Michael Hickman & Owen Cox, Developing the PRC Property Market, HONG KONG LAW., 
Oct. 2002, at 32. See also Li LING HIN, PRIVATIZATION OF URBAN LAND IN SHANGHAI 31 (1996). 
 13. RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 11, at 86. The State or Agricultural Collectives owned all 
the land. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/9
p447 Yee note book pages.doc4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] A BID FOR A NEW FUTURE 449 
 
 
 
 
 
 
land.14 This right is not transferable or leasable, and is confined to 
narrowly described purposes.15  
In 1988, China amended its constitution to allow for the transfer of 
land use rights in urban areas.16 These transferable land use rights are 
termed granted land use rights.17 Unlike allocated land use rights, granted 
land use rights are transferable, leasable, and have broader usage 
potential.18 Granted land use rights were a product of China’s market-
oriented economic development in the coastal cities, which began in 
1978.19 Whereas under the allocated land use rights system, land and 
property only had a utilitarian function, under the granted land use rights 
system, land use rights became an investment medium.20  
B. Land Use Rights Assignment Processes 
In China, land use rights can be assigned by the State via one of two 
processes. The first process is referred to as land use rights transfer by 
agreement.21 Under the Regulations, this process no longer applies to land 
 14. Id. “The term ‘allocated land use rights’ became part of the vocabulary of Chinese legal 
scholars when China began a policy of creating a different species of land use rights—rights for which 
the State demanded compensation and which did not have a definite term.” Id. 
 15. Id. at 90. See generally id. at 85–123 (providing a detailed overview of allocated land use 
rights). 
 16. Id. at 125. 
In 1988, as part of a general government program to “commodify” the productive economy—
to establish market transactions as a means of resource distribution, China amended its 
Constitution to provide for the transfer of land use rights. The 1988 amendment permits the 
creation of a new form of land use rights. These rights are transferable and exist for a 
specified term. 
Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 90. See generally id. at 125–58 (providing a detailed overview of granted land use 
rights). 
 19. JIEMING ZHU, THE TRANSITION OF CHINA’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT: FROM PLAN-
CONTROLLED TO MARKET-LED 2 (1999). In 1978, the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, 
science, and defense) policy was integrated into the new Constitution. Under this policy, China began 
participating in the world market after thirty years of self-reliance and inwardness. Major market 
reforms were primarily implemented only in the major coastal cities. Id. 
The reforms were expected to stimulate the inactive urban economy, which had been, as 
believed, stifled by central planning. The new policies called for a shift of strategy from 
overemphasized self-reliance to participation in the world market and from inward-looking, 
self-sufficient production to outward-looking trading in the context of globalization. 
Id. 
 20. Id. at 4. Under a “utilitarian” function, the land is used for a specified use only. As an 
“investment medium,” land becomes a commodity that can be traded in the open market. Id.  
 21. Id. at 75. 
Land prices would be negotiated between applicants and the local land bureau. The negotiated 
land prices usually cover at least the costs for green land acquisition from peasants who 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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use rights for business operations.22 Before the promulgation of the 
Regulations, the land use rights transfer by agreement was reserved for 
business or development purposes that fell under specified categories, 
such as high-tech, capital-intensive manufacturing, or public-use facilities 
such as educational institutions or public housing.23 Under this process the 
applicant and the local land bureau negotiated a purchase price.24 
Most applicants are local real-estate companies that are property 
speculators with inside connections.25 As a result, the purchase price is 
often heavily discounted by subsidies (available only to these insiders) at a 
price that usually covers only the government’s costs for the land.26 After 
the initial purchase, the assigned land use rights are then traded several 
times before the final buyer begins construction development.27 As such, 
the accrued costs fall onto the final buyer.28 This assignment process is one 
of the main reasons that property in Beijing and Shanghai is among the 
most expensive in Asia.29 
The second process for land use rights assignment follows a market-
oriented approach to determine the purchase price. Under the Regulations, 
this process now covers all land use rights assignments for business 
operations.30 The market-oriented approach includes two different 
procedures for determining the market rate.31 The first procedure is 
commonly referred to as land use rights transfer by bidding.32 Bidding is 
traditionally reserved for land involving commercial development.33 Under 
this procedure, applicants submit their bid package, which includes the bid 
collectively own the rural land, relocation of sitting tenants, and basic land development, 
which the government has paid for before it is ready for conveyance. 
Id. 
 22. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 23. ZHU, supra note 19, at 74. 
 24. Id. at 75. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 25. David Murphy, China’s New Rules on Land Sales Boost Access, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, 
at A18. “Many of the tens of thousands of real-estate companies in China are property speculators. 
Part of a well-connected circle, they acquire parcels of land from government entities relatively 
cheaply.” Id.  
 26. ZHU, supra note 19, at 75. “The negotiated land prices usually cover at least the costs for 
green land acquisition from peasants who collectively own the rural land, relocation of sitting tenants, 
and basic land development . . . . Hence, the government can recover development expenses.” Id. 
 27. Murphy, supra note 25, at A18. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 31. ZHU, supra note 19, at 75. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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price and development proposal, to a bid evaluation group.34 After 
consultation, the group determines a winner who bids the highest price 
while still satisfying the bid criteria.35 The second procedure is commonly 
referred to as land use rights transfer by auction.36 Auctions are 
traditionally reserved for land plots in a prime location for commercially 
profitable uses.37 The bottom-line (minimum) price for both bidding and 
auction procedures is determined by the local land bureau.38 As of the date 
of promulgation of the Regulations, July 1, 2002, bidding and auctions 
were extremely rare and most land acquisitions were performed by 
agreement.39  
II. THE REGULATIONS 
A. Purpose and Coverage 
Article 1 clearly states the three main purposes of the Regulations. 
First, the Regulations “regularize the behaviors of assignment of the state-
owned land use rights.”40 Second, the Regulations “optimize the allocation 
of land resources.”41 Finally, the Regulations “establish an open, fair, and 
impartial land use system.”42  
In order to fulfill the purposes set forth in article 1, all assignments of 
state-owned land use rights through bidding, auction, or listing are 
governed by the standardized process laid out in the Regulations.43 
Furthermore, the Regulations require that all land for business operations 
be assigned through bidding, auctions, or listing.44 Consequently, land use 
 34. Id. The bid evaluation group usually consists of the assignor’s representative as well as other 
parties that are deemed experts regarding the land being conveyed. See Regulations, supra note 2, art. 
13, § 3. 
 35. Id. art. 14. 
 36. ZHU, supra note 19, at 75. 
 37. Id. Market prices in these areas tend to be unknown because few transactions have occurred. 
The rate fetched at auction can serve as a market benchmark price for other similar land plots. Id. at 
76. 
 38. Regulations, supra note 2, art. 10. 
 39. Murphy, supra note 6, at 28. “To date, open auctions are rare and the vast bulk of land 
transfers take place in back-room deals that lead to agreements between the landholder and developer.” 
Id. 
 40. Regulations, supra note 2, art. 1. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. art. 2. 
 44. Id. art. 4. 
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rights transfer by agreement no longer applies to land use rights for 
business operations.45 
B. The Acquisition Process 
The acquisition of land use rights proceeds as follows: 
1. Planning—Municipal or county level administrative departments 
make plans for the assignment of land use rights, and publish these plans 
for the benefit of the public upon approval by the municipal or county 
governments.46  
2. Announcement—The assignor publishes a public announcement of 
sale at least twenty days before the date of bidding, auction, or listing.47 
The announcement must include the details of the land being assigned, the 
qualifications of the bidders, and the place, time, and method of bidding, 
auction, or listing.48 
3. Opening Price—Local and municipal administrative departments 
determine the opening price and bottom-line bid price based on land 
appraisals.49 The bottom-line bid price remains confidential.50 
4. Bidding, Auction, and Listing—The Regulations detail a 
standardized procedure for bidding, auction, and listing.51 In the case of 
bidding, a bid evaluation group, consisting of the assigner and relevant 
experts,52 evaluates the bids and determines the winner.53 In the case of 
auctions, the final bidder is the winner.54 
5. Publishing of the Results—Within ten working days of the 
completion of the bidding, auction, or listing, the assignor publishes the 
corresponding results.55  
 45. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 46. Regulations, supra note 2, art. 5. Plans for assignment of land use rights are made in 
accordance with the government planning for economic development, industrial policies, annual plans 
for land use, city planning, and market conditions. Id.  
 47. Id. art. 8. The assignor is the seller or previous owner of the land use right. The State owns all 
urban land. RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 11, at 62, (quoting article 10 of the Chinese 
Constitution. Zhonghua renmin gonghequo xianfa [PRC CONST.] art. 10 (2004)). 
 48. Regulations, supra note 2, art. 9. 
 49. Id. art. 10. 
 50. Id. 
 51. For the bidding procedure, see id. art. 13. For the auction procedure, see id. art. 15. For the 
listing procedure, see id. art. 17. 
 52. Id. The Regulations do not state who the “relevant experts” will be. However, the panel will 
likely include land appraisers and other government administrative officials. 
 53. Id. art. 13, § 3. The bid evaluation group is not mandated to automatically choose the highest 
bidder as the winner. See id. art. 14. 
 54. Id. art. 15, § 8. 
 55. Id. art. 12. 
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6. Fraud—The Regulations address and detail consequences for three 
potential instances of fraudulent activity that might arise from the 
assignment of land use rights. First, if an administrative department 
assigns land use rights by agreement that should have been, instead, 
assigned by bidding, auction, or listing, it will receive administrative 
sanctions.56 Second, a bid that wins by means of bribery or malicious 
collaboration is invalid.57 Finally, any administrative department that is 
negligent in performing its duties under the Regulations, abuses its 
authority, or practices favoritism will be subject to disciplinary 
sanctions.58 
7. Implementation—Local and municipal administrative departments 
are in charge of drafting and implementing the land use rights assignment 
schemes in accord with the Regulations.59 
III. EFFECTS OF THE REGULATIONS 
A. Predictability 
A primary purpose of the Regulations is to create a predictable and 
standardized land use rights assignment process.60 Before promulgation of 
the Regulations, local land administrative authorities followed varying 
land use rights acquisition processes.61 One of the main complaints of 
foreign land and property developers in China is the complexity of the 
land use rights assignment process.62 The standardized procedures laid out 
in the Regulations should unify the local land use rights acquisition 
process, providing investment predictability.63 Mr. Wang Shouzhi, Deputy 
 56. Id. art. 24. 
 57. Id. art. 25. 
 58. Id. art. 26. 
 59. Id. art. 6. 
 60. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 61. Hickman & Cox, supra note 12, at 32. 
 62. Id.  
Many foreign investors in China have failed to understand China’s complex land system and 
some have seen their investments lose substantial value as a result. China’s present land 
system can be difficult to fathom. There are many national laws and regulations, 
supplemented by a host of local regulations and practices, some of which seem inconsistent 
with the national regulatory regime.  
Id. See also Yang Li, Land Auctions Allow Real Estate Firms to Expand Biz Nationwide, BUS. 
WEEKLY, Feb. 11, 2003, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.en/en/doc/2003-02/ll/content_ 
155099.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). “Before the land auction system was introduced nationwide 
last July, most land transactions were made privately. In Beijing, 95 percent of the land transactions 
were private.” Id. 
 63. China Issues New Regulations for Public Bidding of Land Use Rights, AGENCE FRANCE-
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Director of the Ministry of Land and Resources’ Department of Land 
Utilization Management explains: “After [the Regulations become] 
effective on July 1, investors should no longer find our land bidding 
procedure puzzling . . . [and] foreign investors should find the Chinese 
market similar to the world market instead of a strange one filled with 
confusing stipulations.”64 
B. Transparency 
Another primary purpose of the Regulations is to create a fair and 
impartial land use rights assignment process.65 The Regulations address 
the issue of fraud and mandate disciplinary sanctions against 
administrative authorities that abuse their power.66 Although the severity 
of the sanctions is unknown, the declaration of sanctions nonetheless 
makes it clear that corruption in assigning land use rights will no longer be 
tolerated. The Regulations also require publication of the bidding results 
within ten days of sale.67 Through this feature, bids will be public 
knowledge and administrative authorities can be held accountable for any 
improprieties in the result.68  
The incidence of corruption in the assignment of land use rights is a 
particularly acute problem under the land use rights transfer by agreement 
process.69 Because the purchase price is privately negotiated,70 good 
guanxi (relations) between the purchaser and government officials is an 
absolute necessity.71 However, this opens the door to bribery and 
favoritism.72 By mandating that all land use rights relating to business 
operations are to be assigned via the bidding, auction, or listing process, 
local insiders no longer garner the benefits of privately negotiated, back-
PRESSE, May 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2408359. 
 64. Id.  
During a four-year pilot phase to mobilize local governments to transfer the right to use state-
owned land through public bidding, the ministry allowed different regions to design their own 
bidding procedures under the country’s Land Law and the Law of Urban Real Estate 
Management. But the procedures varied from one region to another and investors were 
constantly having to adapt.  
Id. 
 65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 66. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 68. Murphy, supra note 25, at A18. 
 69. Murphy, supra note 6, at 28. 
 70. Under the land use rights transfer by agreement process, the purchase price is privately 
negotiated between the local land bureau seller, and the purchaser. See ZHU, supra note 19, at 75. 
 71. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 28.  
 72. See id. 
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room deals.73 A Beijing-based real-estate developer describes this 
welcome change: “Developers will be able to go straight to the land 
bureau and will no longer have to curry favor with the mayor, department 
heads, and other officials who have control over the scores of licenses 
needed before construction gets under way.”74 
IV. LESSONS FROM SHANGHAI AND THE WASTELAND 
A. The Shanghai Experience 
In 2001, the Shanghai municipal government issued land use rights 
assignment regulations that became the model for the national policy.75 
Like the national Regulations, the Shanghai regulations mandate 
assignment of all business operations land use rights via bidding, auction, 
or listing.76 The effects of the Shanghai regulations on the Shanghai land 
use rights market offer important lessons at the national level. 
After the Shanghai regulations took effect in July of 2001, 
implementation had a seemingly quick start as designated parcels of land 
in Shanghai were sold by open bidding to both foreign and domestic 
developers.77 However, upon further examination, the success of the 
implementation of the Shanghai regulations is questionable.78 Most of the 
land parcels subject to the new assignment process are located in the urban 
fringe areas, while valuable land parcels in the inner city remain available 
for sale only by the land use rights transfer by agreement process.79 These 
valuable inner-city parcels fall under a special exception as part of an 
urban renewal project and are not available under the open bidding 
process.80 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Hickman & Cox, supra note 12, at 32. “In mid-2001, the Shanghai Municipal Government 
issued three regulations as a precursor to the national regulations. Together these regulations unified 
the previously separate domestic and foreigner’s housing markets and introduced a tender and auction 
system for granting land use rights.” Id. Previously, urban housing was divided between domestic 
commodity housing and housing for sale to foreigners. Typically, housing for sale to foreigners is 
much more expensive. Id. 
 76. Id. Cf. Regulations, supra note 2, art. 4. 
 77. Andrew Ness, Land Grant System Set for Overhaul, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 25, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 26305176. From July 2001 to September 2002, twenty-seven parcels of 
land were to be sold under the new system. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. Of the twenty-seven parcels, sixty percent are located in the suburban areas of Shanghai. 
Id. 
 80. Id. 
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Moreover, the twenty-seven parcels that were sold under the market- 
oriented approaches did not necessarily go to the highest bidder.81 The 
tender evaluation committee based its decision on various other factors 
that were not made public.82 After publishing the results,83 a minor uproar 
within Shanghai property development circles ensued.84 The controversy 
forced the Shanghai Municipal Tender/Auction Bureau to halt temporarily 
the policy of publishing bidding results.85  
The experience in Shanghai has also exhibited how local “insider” 
property developers were able to preempt the regulations.86 Local 
developers bought up the last remaining prime inner-city sites just prior to 
when the Shanghai regulations took effect.87 The land use rights of these 
prime sites were assigned via the land use rights transfer by agreement 
process at a heavily discounted price.88 
Those sites that were assigned via market-oriented approaches garnered 
significantly higher prices.89 Although local developers had an advantage 
before the regulations took effect, they could not stop the influx of foreign 
demand for the few Shanghai land use rights made available in the open 
market.90 Winnie Mak, a property analyst for HSBC in Hong Kong, 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. Like the Regulations, the Shanghai regulations also require publication of the results after 
bidding. Id. 
 84. Id.  
Shanghai has also served as an example of how a small group of determined local developers, 
fortified by good market intelligence concerning the impending regulatory moves, succeeded 
in circumventing the system, at least in the short term. They moved in to scoop up a number 
of the last remaining prime inner-city sites by private treaty, just before the new regulations 
came into effect. 
Id. 
 85. Id. The Bureau made no indication as to when publication of bidding results would resume. 
Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. “This was done on the understanding the action was sufficient to allow them to be 
exempted from having to surrender their recently acquired site to the government, with the sole 
comfort of having an option to re-acquire it through tender by invitation.” Id. “According to the 
procedures issued by the Shanghai municipal government, land is exempt from open bidding if the 
developer of a given site has already obtained planning approval and the necessary documentation to 
undertake construction in phases before implementation of the new tender system.” Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Murphy, supra note 6, at 28. In a Shanghai auction for a forty-eight hectre site, a Guangzhou 
real estate firm outbid two local firms, paying $381 million. Id. at 31. Initial signs indicate that 
“[g]reater openness is releasing pent-up demand among outsiders and forcing prices up.” Id. See also 
Chen & Wills, supra note 1, at 68. In Shenzhen, in 1991 and 1992, the price per square meter of land 
use rights assigned by bidding or auction was over five times that of land use rights assigned by 
agreement. Id.  
 90. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 28. Outsiders are not only foreign (non-Mainland Chinese) 
developers. They also include developers from other regions across the Mainland. Id. 
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explains the outsider demand phenomenon: “Because outsiders didn’t 
have rich land resources in the past, they are now playing catch-up.”91 
B. Lessons from Shanghai 
Although the Regulations were promulgated at the national level, 
implementation will be left to the local and municipal governments.92 
Shanghai and Beijing have passed their own laws that mirror the 
Regulations,93 yet, both cities have experienced setbacks in the 
implementation process.94 While transparency in the land use rights 
assignment process is a main goal of the Regulations, it will take some 
time before local authorities will be able to implement them fully.95 
Selected site application (non-universal application to all business 
operations land use rights), failure to publish bidding results, and 
regulatory preemption are all potential setbacks to implementation that 
other cities may expect, given the effects in Shanghai.  
In addition to implementation delay, foreign developers should also be 
wary of the insider advantages local developers may continue to hold in 
the Chinese property market.96 Naturally, local developers that previously 
enjoyed insider advantages will not surrender to outsiders.97 For instance, 
in Shanghai, local developers have been attempting to preempt the 
regulations by buying early, before the law changes.98 Even after the 
Regulations take effect, these local developers will continue to search for 
loopholes, and will benefit from their established connections within the 
local government.99 Since the local government wears two hats—one as 
 91. Id. at 31. 
 92. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Ness, supra note 77, at 4. On June 28, 2002, the Beijing municipal government issued a 
memorandum mandating an end to the land use rights transfer by agreement process. Id. 
 94. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. Beijing is in the process of establishing a 
“land bank” that will serve as a central repository for land use rights sites. Ness, supra note 77, at 4. 
Due to the slow progress to date in establishing this municipal land bank, intended as the 
central repository of the sites to be offered for sale on this open and competitive basis, Beijing 
still has some way to go before a balance can be achieved between the interests of the 
municipal government, state-owned enterprises possessing land-use rights for central-city 
sites and local development interests. 
Id.  
 95. Murphy, supra note 6, at 28.  
 96. Id. 
 97. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 99. Murphy, supra note 6, at 29. 
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regulator and the other as seller—the potential for corruption will continue 
to be high.100  
While local developers may have a “home-field” advantage, they will 
face a stiff challenge both from other domestic developers throughout 
mainland China and from foreign developers—both with deep pockets.101 
Large Hong Kong and Singapore-based developers have been active in the 
Shanghai land market since the early 1990s and have learned important 
lessons from their experience handling the local market.102 Other foreign 
developers have been increasingly active in buying property, and have 
made significant inroads toward becoming serious players in the Shanghai 
property market, especially in the secondary market.103 As foreign 
developers become more accustomed to the local landscape, they will 
 100. Id. at 28. This situation occurred in Hong Kong. A “cozy” relationship between the Hong 
Kong government and large property developers aided in maintaining extraordinarily high land prices. 
Id. 
 101. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. See also, Developer Hails New Land Policy, THE 
STANDARD (Hong Kong), July 9, 2002 (on file with The Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review). 
 102. Murphy, supra note 6, at 30. Large Hong Kong developers are known to have 
underperformed. Id. Nonetheless, because of past difficulties, they are now more aware of how to 
handle the local market. Id.  
Nobody knows that better than Hong Kong and Singapore-based developers who have 
learned from some of their mistakes in China. Cash-rich Hong Kong developers in particular 
were a principal source of investment in China’s real-estate booms in the early 1990s. But 
they focused heavily on acquiring land and overlooked marketing and tailoring their product 
to local needs, say developers and real-estate analysts. In China, Hong Kong developers 
overall are judged to have badly underperformed.  
Id.  
Many overseas Chinese developers got into China early, believing they had an advantage over 
both locals and Westerners. Some, especially those from Hong Kong, fell victim to the 
Chinese Communist Party bureaucracy. For example, Kerry Properties of Hong Kong paid 
heavily in 1993 for land near Shanghai’s railway station after being told by government 
officials that it was the only land available in that part of town . . . Only after committing to 
the investment did the company discover that sites were being released for development along 
the city’s Nanjing and Huahai Roads. It had paid top rates for second-tier land. 
Id. 
 103. Id. “[F]oreign institutional investors are also beginning to make their presence felt. They 
want Grade-A buildings in prime locations with sitting tenants . . . And overseas institutional investors 
and developers now exist in sufficient numbers for a nascent secondary market among foreign players 
to be emerging.” Id. 
 In the “secondary” market, the seller has obtained the land use rights from the government and is 
selling the assigned land use rights to another buyer. These transactions are the next round of sales, 
after the initial land use rights assignment. Id. at 28. “The sale of nonperforming loan portfolios, 
including property, by state asset-management companies is also likely to contribute to the growth of 
another secondary market. It’s still at an early stage but buyers look for a quick turnaround and do not 
want to become long-term investors in property . . .” Id. at 31. 
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certainly seek to expand beyond the secondary market and take advantage 
of the market oriented approaches in land use rights assignment.104 
C. The Luliang Prefecture105 Experience 
The rural regions have been slow to adopt market-oriented approaches 
in land use rights assignment.106 The Luliang prefecture, in contrast, has 
been at the forefront in applying a market-oriented approach in land use 
rights assignment, auctioning rural wasteland land use rights since the 
early 1980s.107 Luliang formalized its auction process in 1992, thereby 
becoming the first prefecture to adopt a prefecture-wide process for the 
auctioning of wastelands.108 The effects of the auction process undertaken 
in Luliang offer important lessons at the national level. 
 104. Developer Hails New Land Policy, supra note 101. See also Murphy, supra note 25, at A18. 
In October [2001], Hines, Lowe Enterprises and investment firm Trust Company of the West, 
both of the U.S., paid $95 million to South Korean conglomerate Hyundai for a 24-story 
office tower in Beijing. In June, Rodamco Asia NV of the Netherlands paid a subsidiary of 
Singapore-listed CapitaLand $23 million for a 72% stake in a 27-story serviced-residence 
complex in Shanghai. And in 2000, Hong Kong Resorts bought a Shanghai apartment 
complex from Kerry Properties Ltd. of Hong Kong.  
Id. 
 105. “A prefecture is the largest political subdivision below the province level.” Tim Hansted & 
Li Ping, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Auditioning Rights to Wasteland, 19 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 545, 548 n.16 (1997). 
 106. RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 11, at 147. “Rural areas have been slow to move to 
auctions, perhaps because of concerns about whether there is an adequate base of bidders, or because 
of a perceived need to use the negotiation process to squeeze the greatest return from the developers 
who are available.” Id. at 147–48. 
 107. Hanstad & Li, supra note 105, at 548. Luliang prefecture is located in Shanxi Province, along 
the Yellow River, and is 500 km southwest of Beijing. It is one of the poorest regions in China, with 
an average annual income of U.S. $90. Wasteland covers about thirty-seven percent of its total land 
area. Id. “Wasteland” is a term used to describe uncultivated (non-arable) land that is deemed 
“reclaimable,” or open for sale by the collectives for agricultural development. Id. at 546–47. 
 The sale of wastelands is part of the ‘de-collectivization’ efforts by the central government to 
promote rural farmers’ Land Use Rights. Id. The central government does not have specific guidelines 
relating to the assignment of wastelands. Id. at 547. This allows local governments to experiment with 
various assignment processes, such as auctioning. Id. 
Developing this wasteland for agricultural production and forestation holds tremendous 
economic and ecological potential . . . Despite this tremendous potential, the Chinese 
government has not addressed wasteland development in its policy-making agenda. Due in 
part to the absence of uniform central government guidelines, various regions throughout the 
PRC have conducted experiments with waste land use rights, including auctions. 
Id. 
 108. Id. at 548. “Luliang began sporadically auctioning wasteland in the early 1980s, formalized 
wasteland auctions in 1992, and was the first prefecture in the PRC to adopt a prefecture-wide program 
of wasteland auctions.” Id. “There are no national rules for land auctions. Although recent policies 
have been announced prohibiting party officials, government organizations and their affiliated units 
favor participating in auctions. Most provincial or local governments will have established their own 
formal procedures.” RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 11, at 148. 
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In Luliang, a “village auction leading group” determines the sites 
offered for auction, as well as the starting bid price.109 Auction information 
is posted throughout the village one month before the auction date,110 and 
the auctions may be either closed or open.111 In some villages, when 
villagers show interest in bidding on a site, a closed auction is used that 
limits bidding to villagers only.112 In other villages, if it is likely the site 
can command a significantly higher bid from outsiders, an open auction is 
used and outsiders are invited to bid, regardless of villager interest.113 In 
wasteland auctions, government employees are not allowed to make 
bids.114 Not surprisingly, these auctions are very competitive, with most 
purchasers paying three to six times the starting bid.115  
Hanstad and Li make several key observations based on their fieldwork 
in Luliang.116 First, they point out the open auctions are dominated by 
wealthy, outsider landholders.117 Hanstad and Li recommend that closed 
auctions should be promoted to encourage local, rather than outsider 
ownership.118 Second, there is no limit on the amount of wasteland a single 
individual can purchase,119 and this absence intensifies economic 
inequality between large landholders and poor, local farmers.120 Third, 
purchasers must pay in one lump sum.121 Hanstad and Li suggest 
promoting the use of installment payments in order to extend the pool of 
potential purchasers.122 Indeed, several farmers interviewed had a keen 
interest in bidding, but did not have the financial resources for a single 
lump sum payment.123 
 109. See Hanstad & Li, supra note 105, at 550. The group consists of the village cadre as well as 
other village representatives. Id. The group’s decisions are subject to the approval of the villagers. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 549. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 549–50. 
 115. Id. at 556. In one village, the wasteland price appreciated ten times over a two-year period. 
Id. 
 116. Id. at 554, 566–69. In 1995, Hanstad and Li, with the assistance of the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Research Center of Rural Economy, conducted research on rural wasteland auctions in 
the Luliang prefecture. Id. at 548. They were briefed by Luliang government officials on the prefecture 
assignment process and also interviewed both successful and unsuccessful bidders. Id. at 554.  
 117. Id. at 567. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. “[S]ome households have contracted as much as 10,000 mu [555.7 hectares] of wasteland 
through auctions.” Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 568. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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D. Lessons from Luliang 
These observations from auctions in Luliang parallel effects witnessed 
in Shanghai, and suggest potential recommendations for national-level 
regulations.124 The open auction process mirrors the move by Shanghai 
and the national government to inject openness and competition in the 
assignment of land use rights. When the open auction process was used, 
wealthy outsider landholders were quick to purchase property that would 
otherwise likely remain in the hands of local individuals.125 In Shanghai, a 
similar phenomenon occurred when the market approach to land use rights 
assignment was mandated.126 If these effects hold true at the national level 
under the less restrictive land use rights assignment process, wealthy 
foreign developers with deep pockets should hold a comparative 
advantage over their local counterparts. Hanstad and Li’s 
recommendations for curbing outsider ownership entail pulling back from 
the market approach,127 favoring in its stead a closed and preferential 
system as the better solution.128 Shanghai and the national government, 
through the Regulations, have mandated an open system through the 
market approach for the assignment of land use rights. The Regulations, 
however, spell bad news for local developers, who will find it difficult to 
effectively compete with the wealthy outsiders who invade their markets. 
CONCLUSION 
For foreign developers, the Regulations are a welcome event as they 
can now refer to a standardized procedure for land use rights assignment. 
The experience in Shanghai and Luliang indicates that the market 
approach for land use rights assignment benefits outsiders by eliminating 
back-room dealing and advantages held by locals. Luliang’s dual approach 
of open and closed auctions allows locals to continue participating in the 
wasteland acquisition process. However, regarding state-owned land use 
rights at the national level, local developers will not have the luxury of a 
preferential process under the Regulations.  
Nonetheless, foreign developers must approach the Regulations with 
caution. The experience in Shanghai demonstrates the importance of full 
 124. Id. at 577. 
 125. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
 128. Id. 
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local implementation and the obstacles to achieving that end.129 Indeed, it 
should be expected that local developers who have enjoyed preferential 
treatment in the past will fight hard to hold on to their markets.130  
On balance, the Regulations are a step in the right direction. Equal 
treatment of both domestic and overseas enterprises and less government 
intervention are critical steps toward creating a transparent and predictable 
land investment environment. Under the Regulations, local developers 
lose their preferential treatment and will be forced to compete effectively 
in the marketplace in order to survive,131 thus making them leaner and 
stronger competitors.132 Yue Xiaowu, Director of the Property Division of 
the Land Use Management Department of the Ministry of Land and 
Resources, describes this bright future paved by the Regulations: “The 
abolition of some preferential policies is nothing more than an essential 
improvement in China’s investment environment . . . . Nothing is more 
valuable than a set of transparent, fair and consistent game rules governing 
the market, that is free from government intervention.”133 The regulations 
have provided the necessary competitive, market-oriented approach in the 
land use rights arena, while also serving as a model for regulatory reforms 
in other spheres of the Chinese economy. 
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 129. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 86–88, 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 131. Tang Min, Land-Use Rights: Revision on Books, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 16, 2002, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com/cn/en/doc/2002-09/16/content_136275.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. 
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